

Approved For Release 2001/3/10 : CIA-TPB-50975A007400500001-4

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

21 January 1964

[Redacted]  
Copy No. C

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



[Redacted]  
25X1

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Approved For Release 2001/3/10 : CIA-TPB-50975A007400500001-4

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00740500001-4  
25X1

21 January 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Tanganyika: Implications of army mutiny are far from clear. (Page 1)

25X1

3. Notes: [redacted] Belgium; Haiti; [redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00740500001-4  
25X1

25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 January 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

\*Tanganyika: Dar-es-Salaam is calm at the moment, but the implications of yesterday's army mutiny are far from clear.

There is no positive evidence that the mutiny had any political overtones. The troops apparently were interested mainly in pay increases and the removal of British officers. Once these demands were met, the army reaffirmed its support of the government.

Before the mutiny was contained, however, it had brought to the surface latent anti-white and anti-Asian sentiment in the African population, both military and civilian. Britain reacted to the ensuing rioting and looting by alerting 2,000 troops for possible duty in Tanganyika to protect the 5,000 British nationals there.


The Tanganyika Government's handling of the crisis seems to have enhanced the position of External Affairs and Defense Minister Kambona at the expense of President Nyerere. Nyerere's whereabouts has been a mystery throughout the mutiny. Kambona, on the other hand, has borne the brunt of the negotiations with the mutineers.

The increased stature of Kambona, an ambitious radical nationalist, is likely to be reflected in the power structure when order is restored.

25X1

25X1

25X1



Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

NOTES

25X1

Belgium: Foreign Minister Spaak told Ambassador MacArthur on 17 January that Belgium would not follow France's lead in recognizing Peiping now, despite increasing domestic pressure to do so. Spaak may hope to hold off recognition at least until the return of a private commercial mission which is preparing to visit Communist China. The mission, which will be accompanied by a government trade official, reportedly is scheduled to depart in late March.

25X1

Haiti: US Ambassador Timmons presented his credentials to President Duvalier on 16 January in an atmosphere marked by a strong undercurrent of hostility toward the US. In his remarks, Duvalier told Timmons that the success of his mission depended on the rapid resolution of "four political problems," but failed to say what they are. Timmons notes, however, that Duvalier's references to these "problems" have been highlighted in the local press, and thinks this may indicate that the regime is preparing the public for some new initiative against the US.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400500001-4

Approved For Release 2003/02/10 : CIA PDP79T00975A007400500001-4

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/02/10 : CIA PDP79T00975A007400500001-4

**TOP SECRET**